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Abstract
Andrew Chadwick’s view of today’s “hybrid media system,” as outlined first in his 2013 book of the same 
name, has moved scholars to understand how changes in politics are linked to changes in communication 
infrastructures and tools and to the ways people negotiate power in the networked media environment. 
His work has provided readers with a blueprint to follow that moves focus beyond the usual categories of 
media and the usual sites of power. In this interview, conducted in November, 2019, Chadwick discusses 
what he calls “dysfunctional hybridity” and the urgency that kind of hybridity brings to the need to update 
our thinking about media, power and society.
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Andrew Chadwick’s view of today’s “hybrid 
media system,” as outlined first in his 2013 
book of the same name, has moved schol-
ars to understand how changes in politics 
are linked to changes in communication 
infrastructures and tools and to the ways 
people negotiate power in the networked 
media environment. His work has provid-
ed readers with a blueprint to follow that 
moves focus beyond the usual categories of 
media and the usual sites of power. In the 
fall of 2018, just after the publication of the 
updated second edition of The Hybrid Me-
dia System, in which Chadwick responds 
to Trump-Brexit-era developments, Colin 
Porlezza and Philip Di Salvo, the editors 
of this Thematic Section, convened an 
ECREA pre-conference in Lugano, Swit-
zerland, titled Dissolving Boundaries of 
Hybrid Journalism, where I saw firsthand 
the impact of Chadwick’s work on the field. 
Scholars there presented work exploring 
the role played by bots, whistleblowers, ac-
tivists, entrepreneurs, among other actors 
in shaping the structure and content of 
journalism work. I opened the event with a 
talk about my 2016 book, Journalism as Ac-
tivism, which highlights some of the ways 
media activists adept at using and creating 
new communication tools are taking up 
the work of journalists, expanding the field 
in significant ways and shaping on a new 
level traditional news stories and genres. I 
could sense there at the conference a shift 
in thinking among the participants, away 
from old categories and assumptions 
about topics worth studying and where 
power resides. I also saw the way many of 
the participating scholars, myself includ-
ed, are struggling with how to make sense 
of the darker side of hybridity that has 
become apparent in recent years. In the 
interview below, conducted in November, 
2019, Chadwick discusses his recent pre-
occupation with what he calls “dysfunc-
tional hybridity” and about the urgency 
that kind of hybridity brings to the need to 
update our thinking about media, power 
and society. 
This conversation has been lightly ed-
ited and condensed for publication.
Adrienne Russell: The second edition of 
“The Hybrid Media System” (2017), your 
in fluential book, includes a new chap-
ter on the election of Donald Trump and 
a compelling discussion of what you call 
“dysfunctional hybridity,” in which the 
networked media landscape plays host to 
practices and technologies – fake news, bots, 
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hacking, and so on – that contribute to the 
erosion of democratic norms. Yours is one 
of the best updates to a lot of frankly very 
optimistic research and writing, including 
my own, that emphasized the democratic 
potential of the networked environment. 
How did you get there?
Andrew Chadwick: Well, yes, one of the 
challenges of the hybrid media system 
framework is that it celebrates and de-
scribes the increasing diversity of me-
dia-related practices. We can talk about 
how people share information and about 
their interventions in the public sphere. 
We can see how digital media enabled 
a whole range of different activities that 
previously weren’t possible in the broad-
cast-dominated media system. But a lot 
of us missed what I call the dysfunctional 
aspects of hybridity. The same technolog-
ical elements of social media platforms, 
including the way journalists use digital 
sources for their stories – those elements 
also newly empower actors whose ideolo-
gies conflict with what we understand as 
the core of liberal democratic societies.
The big dilemma, really, is how to start 
thinking about the problematic things 
we’ve seen over the last three or four years – 
that I would add were always there – but 
are now surfacing in such concentrated 
and visible forms. How can we understand, 
for instance, the role of the hybrid media 
system in empowering white suprema-
cists, networked misogynists, or racist 
xenophobes? I think that’s what we in the 
field have missed. We’ve underplayed the 
spread of these digitally enabled pathol-
ogies. And maybe that’s because most re-
searchers, generally speaking, work from a 
liberal or leftist perspective, which shapes 
the kinds of things we’ve looked for. A lot 
of the literature on social movements and 
protest using digital media has – not all of 
it but most of it – cherrypicked examples 
that are innately progressive. It has tended 
to ignore examples of activity that aren’t 
progressive. The bigger picture question 
is: What kind of media system do we really 
want to put in place to serve liberal demo-
cratic societies?
Russell: Which raises many more ques-
tions, made more urgent by developments 
over the past three years. Like, what does 
the term liberal democracy mean today, 
given an environment where political in-
stitutions are openly laced with corruption 
and political processes in many cases are 
breaking down?
Chadwick: I appreciate that the term lib-
eral democracy is deeply problematic, 
because there are all kinds of arguments 
about the limitations of that particular 
model of politics. But I think we need to 
take a step back and consider that there are 
certain groups with ideologies that seek to 
undermine the values of tolerance, of mu-
tual understanding, respect, civility – dare 
I even use that term? – and that we’re living 
in a time when these kinds of forces are 
probably more powerful than ever in influ-
encing the public circulation of symbols 
in politics. I can’t remember a time – per-
haps the late 1970s when I was only eight 
or nine years old – when the far right was 
as active as it is in contemporary British 
society, and I think much the same could 
be said about the United States as well 
as Europe, particularly Eastern Europe.
Equally, I think we’ve seen, when it 
comes to the antifeminist movement – the 
“manosphere,” or the various manifes-
tations of networked misogyny online – 
we’ve witnessed an incredible amount of 
visibility for these ideas. We always knew 
they were there, but it’s the visibility and 
the regularity with which they appear in 
the kinds of networked forms of participa-
tion that we now know are hugely import-
ant for all types of political activity.
Where I’m coming at this from, really, 
is to say that, if we look at what we mean 
by media hybridity, we’ve got to open up 
and recognize that many of our theoretical 
perspectives were hatched only in relation 
to progressive examples. Think of Lance 
Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg’s work 
in The Logic of Connective Action (2013) or 
some of my work before The Hybrid Media 
System, in which I examined forms of ac-
tivism largely involving progressive actors 
trying to contest news frames that were 
portraying their side in the worst light. 
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We didn’t train as much attention on the 
way these dynamics also work to empow-
er forces destructive to liberal democratic 
norms.
Russell: In addition to playing catch-up on 
that score, though, there’s also a tendency 
to think and talk and write as if we’re in a 
constant state of change – which is true, we 
are in a constant state of change – but I’m 
wondering about how these trends you’re 
talking about, the ones we missed and that 
we’re living with as a powerful force in our 
lives now, are creating lasting impacts.
Chadwick: I’ve become increasingly inter-
ested in long-term change and how we can 
get beyond the idea that everything is al-
ways and forever in a state of chaos, transi-
tion, and turbulence, and start to focus on 
how norms become embedded. You and 
I have talked before about how people’s 
expectations about acceptable behavior 
start to change, in a rather complex and 
dynamic relationship with technological 
shifts. We have also talked about the kinds 
of social cues people now encounter in the 
media environment. You and I have been 
researching this field for quite a long time 
now – 20 years in my case – and I think 
we’ve got to start pointing to some of the 
longer-term shifts in people’s norms – 
what I’m calling online civic culture.
Russell: Okay, right, so can you talk a lit-
tle about online civic culture in relation to 
Trump and the various cultural and politi-
cal streams that came together to secure his 
election. I thought you very effectively took 
that up in the second edition of “The Hybrid 
Media System”.
Chadwick: Yes, thanks. When it came to 
the new chapter in the second edition, 
it took me a long time, and I became ob-
sessed with it, really going into as much 
depth as I could, within the constraints of 
a book chapter, albeit a rather long one. 
I found that one of the most interesting 
elements of online civic culture in rela-
tion to Trump is that it formed through a 
combination of the activity of both elite 
actors and ordinary members of the pub-
lic. If you think about the role of misinfor-
mation and disinformation in our politics 
now, I think we’ve got to acknowledge the 
role played by ordinary social media users, 
non-elites, in spreading problematic in-
formation. But we’ve also got to be acutely 
aware of the role elites play in introducing 
that information into the media environ-
ment. And, of course, we have to also be 
aware of efforts to document and call out 
such activity.
One example of the latter is Glenn 
Kessler, who has been the editor and chief 
writer of The Washington Post’s “The Fact 
Checker”1 since 2011. He’s produced ex-
traordinary catalogs of the number of in-
terventions that Donald Trump has made 
just based on lies. Trump made more than 
6,000 false and misleading statements 
in the first two years of his presidency. 
We’ve always had partisan bias in media, 
of course, but if Glenn Kessler and his 
fact-checking team is saying on the record 
that they have a catalog of several thou-
sand false utterances, I think we’re in a dif-
ferent kind of environment than where we 
were even ten years ago.
I think there’s also something of a 
broader cultural shift going on, which I’m 
calling the culture of indeterminacy, which 
empowers and disempowers people in 
different ways in different settings. It’s be-
come part of the fabric of our politics in a 
way that I don’t think we could have pre-
dicted even a short time ago. Whether or 
not that’s likely to change when, if, Trump 
doesn’t win next year, I’m not so sure.
Russell: And it’s not an isolated example, of 
course. How is the culture of indeterminacy 
playing out in British politics?
Chadwick: Recently, we’ve seen various 
manifestations. From the Remain side of 
the Brexit debate we‘ve had bizarre state-
ments about the amounts of money that 
supposedly will be available to reinvest in 
public services and the National Health 
Service should the UK not leave the EU. 
1 Glenn Kessler, Fact Checker: The Truth Be-
hind the Rhetoric, The Washington Post. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
fact-checker/wp/category/donald-trump/
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This is a mirror image of the lies that were 
told by the Leave campaign during the 
Brexit referendum. None of these numbers 
is based in any kind of objective reality. 
At the same time, we’ve also seen an 
extraordinary BBC investigation into sup-
porters of the Conservative Party behav-
ing in ways that make their social media 
posts – Facebook posts on Boris John-
son’s public page – appear as if they are 
automated, bot like responses.2 The story 
emerged about three weeks ago. Observers 
started suspecting that posts appearing on 
Boris Johnson’s page – very short bursts of 
commentary saying things like “100 per-
cent agree” or “I’m with you, Boris” – were 
generated by bots. It was a rush to judg-
ment. Fragments of code also started to 
appear in the messages. So it looked as if 
it was an automated, scripted intervention 
that had gone wrong. But it transpired that 
real people were pretending to be bots. 
They were deliberately acting like bots to 
troll critics of Boris Johnson.
Russell: So, the advantage of pretending 
you’re a bot is, like, next level agitation? 
Bots exacerbate polarization, so humans 
behaving in bot-like ways is meant to just 
further piss off the opposition?
Chadwick: This is the thing, right? To goad 
the other side, to, yes, have a sense of mis-
chief, to irritate the opponents. Looking at 
the code that was supposed to have been 
mistakenly introduced, looking at it now, 
it does look like it has just been pasted in 
by somebody, because it doesn’t look like 
any code that would be involved in an au-
tomated campaign. That struck me as just 
extraordinary. I’ve never come across any-
thing like that.
Russell: But it’s recognizable now for what 
it is – a contemporary media practice. But 
it’s also the kind of thing that points to a 
broader cultural shift in how politics is 
playing out, among elites, among everyday 
people, right? What’s it telling us?
2 Joey D’Urso, “The real people pretending 
to be ‘Boris bots’ on Facebook,” BBC, 1 No-
vember, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/
blogs-trending-50218615
Chadwick: It’s obviously an extreme ex-
ample, but what this brings home is the 
unexpected affordances that social media 
environments now provide for inauthentic 
behavior. The game isn’t just about auto-
mated, inauthentic accounts. That whole 
scene has become implicated in a much 
broader scene of trolling and of so-called 
“playfulness.” Not the kind of playfulness 
that people were celebrating in the early 
days of social media, or, going back even 
further, the idea of playfulness around dig-
ital identity in the late 1990s – not that – 
but a disruptive, chaotic, destabilizing 
impulse.
There’s this 2018 American Political 
Science Association conference paper by 
political psychologists Michael Bang Pe-
tersen, Mathias Osmundsen, and Kevin 
Arceneaux, where they talk about the need 
for chaos as a motivator for people who 
spread false information, conspiracy the-
ories and rumors on social media. I think 
that there’s something in that. They did 
surveys in the US and Denmark. There is a 
group – it’s a minority, but it’s a substantial 
minority of people (they estimated these 
attitudes are present in up to 40 percent 
of the US population) – that now see the 
media environment as an opportunity 
to destabilize and to behave in ways that 
amount to giving the finger-stick to polit-
ical elites of various kinds – and indeed to 
the whole rationality of the political pro-
cess. To some extent it’s a manifestation 
of the way the hybrid media system can 
enable these very rapid, real-time inter-
ventions in political discourse in ways that 
weren’t possible before.
Russell: So, what are the implications of 
these interventions – sometimes carefully 
orchestrated but other times spontaneous 
and grassroots?
Chadwick: Mass publics now use social 
media to send signals to others who might 
think “I wouldn’t mind doing some of 
that. I’m on the side of people who want 
to cause a bit of trouble, a bit of mischief, 
and I’ve got reasons for doing it and op-
portunities too”. The reasons people have 
for doing it – that’s the hard part. How we 
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dig into those motivations – and they’re 
likely to be extremely complicated – that’s 
a big challenge for researchers. But if we 
think about the mere existence of the 
need for chaos, in days gone by, we might 
have said, “Well, it’s great. It’s playfulness. 
There’s too much constraint in the public 
sphere” because we’d look at the broadcast 
media system and think ordinary people 
don’t have a say and it’s top-down and 
controlled. Think about when TV became 
really important in politics from the 1960s 
onwards. Well, by the late 1990s, the liter-
ature in political communication was full 
of pessimistic assessments of alienation 
from the media, alienation from the polit-
ical process, apathy, disengagement, as a 
result of the broadcast media system.
But then the Internet comes along 
and everybody thinks “Oh, it’s going to be 
so different. People will get empowered. 
We’re going to see voices in the public 
sphere. We’re going to see pluralism on a 
scale that we haven’t seen before.”
All of that happened, but what we un-
derestimated was that this pluralism also 
enables these kinds of democratically dys-
functional behaviors that we need to keep 
an eye on. That’s been the agenda since 
2016. There’s a whole range of interest-
ing research coming out now and a lot of 
younger scholars are fired up by this agen-
da as well.
Russell: There are all kinds of related im-
plications. At the level of online civic cul-
ture, norms are changing, and there is an 
expansion of ways for people who are dis-
gruntled to express themselves, in playful 
ways and in frightening ways, and so on. 
Meantime, at the level of elite strategizing, 
we have seen an industry emerge around 
developing purposeful interventions into 
the system to disrupt, misinform, and cre-
ate chaos. Given that it may not be a char-
acteristic confined in the media system to a 
moment of transition, but rather one that 
might already be embedded, how do schol-
ars approach these shifted practices?
Chadwick: On the level of documenting it, 
I don’t have any kind of huge methodolog-
ical plan that I want to lay out and say that 
that’s the correct way. There’s some ex-
cellent work emerging. Kate Starbird and 
Emma Spiro, for instance, at the Universi-
ty of Washington, are doing some interest-
ing big data-driven analysis.3 There’s been 
some great experimental literature in the 
field driven by political psychology and 
political communication researchers such 
as Jason Reifler, Adam Berinsky, and Bren-
dan Nyhan. That’s useful, in part, because 
it’s very controlled and strict in its models 
of causality, but it doesn’t say a great deal 
about the specifics of social media envi-
ronments and the particular technological 
designs that shape and constrain the ways 
people behave. I would also say that sci-
ence and technology studies has been a bit 
slow to react to the post-2016 shift.
Surveys are also useful. That’s some-
thing we’ve focused on at the Online Civ-
ic Culture Centre (O3C)4 at my university 
(Loughborough) because we were lucky 
enough to partner with a survey compa-
ny, Opinium Research. What was notable 
about the data we found in a nationally- 
representative survey from late 2018, 
which we published in our report in the 
spring of 2019, is that 43 percent of news 
sharers on UK social media share inac-
curate or false news. Seventeen percent 
knowingly share news they thought was 
made up when they shared it. It’s not a nu-
anced or complex finding, but it does help 
establish just how prevalent and wide-
spread is the behavior. We received quite a 
lot of feedback on that finding – “Are you 
sure?” “Yes, we’re sure,” we said.
Russell: That’s a standout statistic, espe-
cially because it’s difficult for many of us to 
imagine being part of that particular prob-
lem. 
3 See, for example, Kate Starbird, Dharma Dai-
ley, Owla Mohamed, Gina Lee, and Emma 
S. Spiro, “Engage Early, Correct More: How 
Journalists Participate in False Rumors On-
line during Crisis Events.” In Proceedings of 
the 2018 CHI Conference on Human Factors 
in Computing Systems, p. 105. ACM, 2018.
4 Online Civic Culture Centre. https://www.
lboro.ac.uk/research/online-civic-culture- 
centre/
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Chadwick: The underlying reasons for 
these numbers are very, very difficult to 
identify, but just as a simple description, 
it helps put the problem on the agenda. 
I’m currently working on designing a more 
in-depth, longitudinal, qualitative, inter-
view-based study. It’s to try to understand 
in a much more contextual and relational 
way why it is that false and misleading in-
formation has come to have the kind of so-
cial and political utility it does, both online 
and in local communities.
The media literacy debate went a little 
stale, but it’s reemerging powerfully. The 
number of events that I’ve been to over 
the last three years where media literacy 
has been raised as a panacea for all of the 
world’s ills, I can’t tell you – but then little 
gets done about it in relation to online mis-
information. One of the interesting things 
with the media literacy debate is that, as 
computers became more important and 
digital media became more important, the 
debate became much narrower. It often 
became a debate about digital skills and 
how to teach people how to use websites, 
how to buy stuff online, and how to apply 
for a passport or Medicare or whatever. I 
know critics such as danah boyd have ar-
gued that media literacy may have back-
fired because it fostered a culture of cyn-
icism toward media.5 But I’m not so sure 
about whether that applies in all contexts. 
One thing that certainly has happened is 
that digital literacy has become very nar-
rowly defined. There are people who have 
continuously pushed against this, such as 
Sonia Livingstone (2004), for instance.
I think there’s something in the idea 
that we can go into people’s socially situat-
ed daily lives and find out a lot more about 
their motivations for sharing problematic 
information. What is missing at this point 
is a richer, more contextual understand-
ing of the role that information plays in 
people’s everyday lives and how it gains 
and loses social utility for specific groups 
of people. That process is also tied to the 
question of identity. We already know that 
5 See, for example, danah boyd, “Did Media 
Literacy Backfire?” Data & Society, 5 January, 
2017. https://points.datasociety.net/did- 
media- literacy-backfire-7418c084d88d
strong partisans tend to believe infor-
mation that presents their side in a good 
light. We know about motivated reason-
ing, whereby people justify to themselves, 
often using very elaborate methods, their 
pre-existing prejudices and false beliefs. 
They will have those in mind as they are 
exposed to media content. But we know 
much less about what goes into the deci-
sion to share content. That’s what we’ve 
tried to focus on here at O3C – the ingre-
dients that go into the share. But we know 
very little right now, and I don’t think we’re 
likely to learn everything about the ingre-
dients that make the share from large-N 
studies and descriptive, big data studies.
One way we plan instead to study 
this is by asking subjects to take out their 
phones and talk through the problematic 
pieces of information that figure in their 
everyday lives in a detailed, contextual 
way, where one recognizes that there’s re-
flexivity in the interview process. We won’t 
be able to generalize to the population, 
but then we might have much more re-
fined and interesting variables to explore 
in broader survey-based studies. This is 
not to say that qualitative work is superi-
or to general survey-based research; they 
complement each other.
Russell: Right, getting a closeup view of 
how people are actually engaging with the 
material can help know what questions to 
ask. It’s interesting that you’re focusing on 
the media habits of individuals. Can you 
elaborate? Why might it be more interesting 
to look at individual practices rather than 
at things like the kind of technology people 
are using or technology policy?
Chadwick: On the issue of people-ver-
sus-technologies, I’ve just never seen it 
like that. I’m heavily influenced by Latour 
and the ideas of actor-network theory. I’m 
not the only one, of course. There was a 
whole wave in that late-2000s moment, 
lots of interesting ideas floating around 
about the interactions between technolo-
gies and humans and their mutually con-
stitutive roles as actants. I’ve always been 
influenced by that particular perspective. 
When I talk about the hybrid media sys-
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tem, that does include technologies and 
people and all of the interactions between 
them. What I don’t subscribe to, though, 
is the idea that it necessarily means that 
you’re being technologically determinist. 
I dislike that term, and it’s become a lazy 
critique of a lot of work, including Latour’s 
as well. The reality is that we are shaped by 
our interactions with technologies. We’re 
not fully determined by them. The tech-
nological environments within which we 
behave play a role in shaping our behav-
ior, and I’m completely unashamed about 
saying that. That’s not to say that they de-
termine everything in the first or last in-
stance, but they play a role.
When I’m talking about individuals, 
I’m talking about the need to understand 
how individuals are socially situated, but 
also technologically situated as well. Again, 
I’m not the only person. Look at the new 
outpouring of work on algorithms, such 
as Taina Bucher’s great book If … Then, 
which came out last year. (Disclosure: the 
book is published in the Oxford University 
Press series I edit). It’s this idea that it’s not 
a binary either/or when it comes to media 
technologies and social practices. You’ve 
got to look at people in their socially situ-
ated context. Part of that socially situated 
context is a technological context. When 
people are interacting online, the news 
feed, it’s the ways that’s algorithmically cu-
rated – ways that, as we know from surveys, 
many members of the public just don’t 
fully understand. Of course, academic re-
searchers don’t fully understand it either, 
because we don’t have access to whatever 
“secret sauce” makes the algorithms.
When I’m talking about these long-
term shifts in online civic culture, those 
are partly technologically shaped, and 
they’re about the moments of interaction 
between humans and technologies. It’s 
that dialectic that drives the whole pro-
cess forward. I’m not saying that there’s 
something called culture, which is innate 
and intrinsic in human brains, if you will, 
that then acts as a force in the world. What 
I’m saying is that these complex social and 
technological variables, and the ways hu-
mans behave over time, lead to changes 
in expectations about what’s seen as ac-
ceptable and not acceptable in the public 
sphere. That’s the biggest normative con-
cern I’ve got with online civic culture – that 
there are large numbers of people now who 
are seen as willing to engage in behaviors 
that are problematic for liberal democratic 
societies. Does that answer your question 
about a system-versus-individual focus?
Russell: It does. What about the part about 
the elite forces, not the everyday people, 
that are shaping the system in “democrati-
cally dysfunctional” ways? How do we deal 
with that?
Chadwick: That is, in some ways, a more 
tractable problem than the problem of 
digital literacies. That said, it requires 
some kind of political intervention.
We’re now in a situation where the idea 
of the social media company as platform, 
if you start deconstructing it, it’s more and 
more bizarre. I think Tarleton Gillespie’s 
work has been very valuable on this. You’ve 
got these metaphors used by Google, Face-
book, Twitter of providing a stage on which 
others act. The original model is that they 
don’t take much responsibility for the ways 
in which people act, that they’re just pro-
viding a stage, a platform. That model is 
now almost dead. We’re actually seeing 
the dying days of it play out. It won’t be 
as quick a death or even the same kind of 
death, maybe, in the United States as it will 
in, say, Western Europe. For example, we’ve 
seen the signs of that just this week, with 
scholars having a real argument on Twitter 
about freedom of speech and “freedom of 
reach” after Facebook began insisting that 
it won’t regulate political ads the way that 
Twitter has said it will.
There’s a peculiarly US perspective on 
these things. Liberal-left US scholars are 
arguing that it’s wrong to outlaw political 
advertising on Twitter because that will 
create jurisdictional problems and erode 
the anti-Trump movement. Also, that it 
will deny speech and reach to progressive 
movements as well because they want to 
advertise online and inform the public.
It’s really hard to decide what’s po-
litical, and what isn’t, and of course, that 
problem is not going to go away. The Brit-
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ish perspective on these things is very dif-
ferent because historically, we’ve long had 
regulation of advertising in elections. We 
don’t have political advertising on broad-
cast media. That’s why, when we in the UK 
see so much campaign advertising on UK 
social media, it looks like a crazy Wild West 
scenario. British scholars have been far 
more reticent about participating in the 
debate about Twitter’s banning of political 
ads because we recognize that there are 
many, many reasons why you would want 
to regulate political advertising, not least 
because there are inequalities between 
different providers of ads. If you go back to 
the early 2000s and the McCain-Feingold 
Act on campaign finance in the United 
States, one of the Democrats’ major con-
cerns was that the Republicans would al-
ways outspend them using soft money, be-
cause wealthy donors would always tend 
to favor the Republicans.
It is strange that we’re seeing these 
kinds of ideas recur, but the current chang-
es in the media environment are challeng-
ing us all. The established terms of debate 
have quickly started to dissolve.
Coming back to your original ques-
tion about what kinds of interventions 
are required, I think that it’s always going 
to be a mix of government regulation and 
self-regulation by the platform compa-
nies themselves. But that self-regulation 
doesn’t come about by accident or just out 
of the goodness of their hearts; it comes 
from real political pressure, including 
from policymakers, to clean up the Inter-
net. If we’ve got an environment where it’s 
easy for political elites to circulate preju-
dice, falsehoods, all kinds of inaccurate 
information strategically released to di-
vide communities and to pit one commu-
nity against another, whether it’s religious 
or racial, we need to tackle the problem. 
We have to take sides and say, “There are 
things we need to do to make sure that so-
cial media environments are making good 
contributions to civic culture rather than 
eroding or undermining our civic culture.” 
I think that that’s where we are right 
now, though I recognize that is a bizarre 
generalization because there are coun-
tries where there is no genuine freedom 
of speech on social media. But thinking 
about the US and the European context, 
that’s where the debate is happening. This 
means regulation. It will be different in dif-
ferent countries, but I can’t see any reason 
why we shouldn’t look at some form of reg-
ulation as a positive outcome.
Russell: Yes, I agree. On that score, how do 
you perceive the news coverage of the dys-
functions we’ve been discussing? Even as 
recently as 2016, there was very little main-
stream coverage of technology’s role in poli-
tics and strategic political communication, 
the relationship between the data indus-
tries and democracy, of micro-targeting 
publics and misinformation – on so many 
of the things academics have been study-
ing. Cambridge Analytica was a shock to 
the press and to the public, but not so much 
to academics. Now the coverage seems to 
be getting more thorough. The BBC inves-
tigation into the fake bot posts, you just 
mentioned, the recent investigative section 
of the New York Times performing a data 
analysis of Trump’s tweets.6 Some journal-
ism outlets are recognizing how central the 
story of technology is to politics and public 
life. But this is of course complicated by the 
fact that there’s a decrease in trust in these 
press outlets. What’s the proper role for 
journalism and a realistic expectation of 
how effective journalism can be in exposing 
and educating people about “dysfunctional 
hybridity”?
Chadwick: The first thing I’d like to say 
is that the ways in which journalism has 
evolved means journalists are implicated 
in the current crisis on a number of lev-
els. Some of it is just part of the pressure 
of having to adapt to a hyper-competitive 
media environment where the number of 
new actors – not all of them survived but 
still, if you think about the likes of Buzz-
Feed, the likes of Vice – it’s just a much 
more complicated environment in which 
to be a professional elite journalist now 
than it was even ten years ago. If you think 
6 See “The Twitter Presidency,” New York 
Times, 2 Nov. 2019. https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/
trump-twitter-presidency.html
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back twenty years, it’s a completely differ-
ent situation. A lot of the pressure is being 
created by the need to compete.
The reality is that journalists them-
selves are implicated in the obsession with 
breaking news, the obsession with social 
media metrics, the obsession with Trump’s 
latest tweets at what time of the day or night 
and how many likes or retweets they get.
As I’ve shown in The Hybrid Media 
System, journalists have embedded so-
cial media into their working practices, 
not just at the level of sourcing. In other 
words, there are literally journalists, and 
you know this, of course, whose beat is to 
sit and look at social media screens, dash-
boards unfolding all day long. It’s not just 
about that. It’s also that the texture of news 
stories and the actual presentation of facts 
in the world now relies upon social media 
discourse. This is what Trump recognized 
in 2015, actually, long before the election 
campaign properly got underway. He rec-
ognized it really early on.
There were a few people who pointed 
this out, but few were paying attention. 
Then all of a sudden, as soon as he was 
elected, it was, “Let’s go back and look at 
Donald Trump’s tweets,” and, “Oh, yes, we 
saw it all along.”
Quite a few saw it happening during 
the campaign and thought, What’s going 
on here? One of the longstanding argu-
ments about political campaigns is that 
they can use social media to bypass tra-
ditional media. This was said in the days 
back in 2004, 2006, and 2008, when we saw 
email come into its own as a campaign 
medium. The argument was, “They’re go-
ing to bypass traditional media and reach 
the public. They’re going to reach their 
partners and supporters and we won’t 
know anything about it.” What we didn’t 
understand back then (and this is part of 
the hybrid media system framework) is 
that it’s not just about bypassing; it’s about 
influencing. Trump’s approach was not 
about bypassing mainstream media; it 
was about using social media to influence 
mainstream media. That’s become almost 
a truism in the last couple of years, but in 
2016, there weren’t many people saying 
that. In the book, I tried to show how this 
happened. One fascinating thing here is 
how social media have enabled the signal-
ing of transgression. Trump was, and still 
is, “good” at transgressing norms. By that I 
mean the traditional norms that we would 
expect presidential candidates to adhere 
to, he just deliberately rips those up in or-
der to generate attention. Boris Johnson in 
the 2019 UK campaign has used the same 
strategy.
It’s almost like the old cliché, “There’s 
no such thing as negative publicity.” In 
the second edition of The Hybrid Media 
System, I noted that we’re now in a media 
system where attention is such a valuable 
resource, that there are so many opportu-
nities for you as an individual to devote 
your attention to so many different types 
of content, that actually grabbing atten-
tion in that old way, but with new meth-
ods, has become much more important. 
Distortion in the economy of attention in 
the public sphere is something we’re only 
just really coming to grips with.
This is an important part of what 
Trump was doing in 2016. It’s become a 
characteristic in general of strategic cam-
paigners who want to try and grab atten-
tion, even if only very fleetingly, for their 
particular cause. There’s this mythology 
that built up in the 2016 campaign about 
whether or not journalists were taking 
Trump seriously enough and the pitfalls of 
doing so. They face a similar issue when it 
comes to ideas that are destructive of lib-
eral democracy as well. Extreme misogyny, 
white supremacy, misinformation – how 
do you report these things while drawing 
attention to them in a way that shows that 
they are transgressions of norms that ought 
not to be transgressed in a liberal demo-
cratic society? How do you do that in a way 
that doesn’t risk you just simply spread-
ing the word? This is a major problem.
One of the things that’s become fas-
cinating again is thinking about norms 
and the long-term reshaping of people’s 
behavior. We know, going back to social 
psychology studies of the diffusion of ru-
mors, for instance, all the way back to the 
Second World War, is that what the social 
psychologists call fluency is a an important 
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determinant of how people come to hold 
false beliefs.
The disturbing thing about fluency – 
and again, this rests on all of the repetition 
and circulation affordances that we’ve all 
celebrated as being so beneficial about 
social media – the reality is that simple 
repetition and recirculation exposes larger 
numbers of people to problematic infor-
mation. Even if that information is deep-
ly false, it still enhances a sense of ease 
or fluency with the information. Fluency 
leads to credulity. The more fluent you are, 
in other words, the more you’ve been ex-
posed to a particular piece of information, 
even if it’s false, the more likely you are to 
believe it.
It’s a major problem for how jour-
nalists report. Perhaps we’re now seeing 
journalists fighting back and coming out 
the other side, certainly in the big profes-
sional media organizations, such as The 
Washington Post and the New York Times. 
We’re starting to see signs now of a much 
more savvy approach to social media 
as a source for stories. I’ll just park this 
thought for now, but what we also need 
to recognize is that there are many, many 
cash-strapped news organizations that 
don’t get the chance to make this decision. 
They are, by necessity, deeply implicat-
ed in writing and thus amplifying stories 
about viral YouTube videos, or outrageous 
tweets. There’s some interesting research 
now coming out in journalism studies 
that speaks to the new reality of the local 
newsroom. When I say that some news or-
ganizations are getting more savvy, I think 
that’s the elite-of-the-elite organizations, 
and also the well-funded ones, as well. We 
mustn’t forget the political economy of 
this, because the Washington Post is now 
far better resourced than it was before Jeff 
Bezos bought it.
So, yes, journalists are implicated in 
the current crisis, but I also think that it’s 
not just about the structure of the news 
industry. It’s a deeper problem of the so-
cial psychology of behavior online. I’ve 
become more and more interested in the 
individual, psychological roots of people’s 
behavior, the behavioral tradition in psy-
chology: flocking behavior, herding be-
havior, cueing, fluency, why people come 
to act on informational cues in ways that 
don’t seem to be perfectly rational. Well, 
they’re partly explained by the social-cu-
ing contexts of our behavior. When you 
throw technological affordances into that 
mix as well, that makes it even more com-
plicated.
When journalists produce news, part 
of the problem is that they’re now in an 
environment where other people’s behav-
ior and the likelihood of recirculation of a 
story is important and plays a role in what 
gets written about. Journalists might not 
have a full awareness of the limitations 
on the rationality of that environment. We 
need to understand far more about what 
shapes and constrains rationality in the 
public sphere, not least because social 
media discourse goes constantly circuits 
back into professional journalism. This is a 
hybrid media system problem, but I didn’t 
have anything to say about rationality in 
the book.
Russell: It makes a lot of sense to think 
about the social psychology aspect given the 
issues about which people have very differ-
ent perceptions – the seemingly increasing 
areas of irreconcilable differences. I’ve been 
thinking a lot, for example, about climate 
communication and about why there is so 
much discussion and effort around getting 
the right information or the right amount 
of information, even though people who 
doubt and deny climate change continue 
to do so despite the flow of excellent report-
ing. The idea of fluency, that’s actually very 
helpful in thinking about these matters. 
Couldn’t the solution to disinformation be 
simply working to interrupt fluency? 
Chadwick: Yes, the solution is to interrupt 
fluency. But then there’s also motivated 
reasoning. Therefore, even if you’re inter-
rupting the environment in which fluency 
can occur, you’re never fully going to get 
beyond people’s prejudices and precon-
ceived biases. My problem with all of this, 
as a communication and media scholar, is 
where did these biases come from in the 
first place? This is one of the things that’s 
bedeviled our field, hasn’t it? You look at 
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the historical debates: strong effects versus 
weak effects. There’s been a real reluctance 
on the part of many communication and 
media researchers to talk about media ef-
fects. There has to be a renewed conversa-
tion now about where norms and behavior 
actually derive from in the first place and 
how they become embedded over time.
I’m a fan of Mark Deuze’s idea in his 
book Media Life, that we live in media, as 
fish live in water. There’s a lot to be said for 
that perspective. Of course, the mechanis-
tic traditions of some quantitative social 
science finds that difficult to fathom, be-
cause information is theorized as some-
thing that is fully exogenous and operates 
as a force upon us.
We need to understand that peo-
ple’s perceptions of the world are built 
up through many complex but often very 
short-term interactions that accrete over 
time. I think accretion is a good word in 
this regard. As things accrete over time, 
you can see that it’s phony, in a way, to say, 
“If only we could introduce, in a one-off 
setting, correct information about how to 
see climate change.”
I keep coming back to this idea of a 
relational perspective on digital literacies, 
and I deliberately use the plural term, lit-
eracies, because I don’t think we’ll reach a 
stage where there is a singular, universal 
state of being digitally literate. We need to 
understand how different types of infor-
mation have different forms of social util-
ity in specific community, familial, social, 
and cultural contexts. This is the lesson of 
some of the qualitative work that’s emerg-
ing. Think about Arlie Russell Hochschild’s 
book, Strangers in Their Own Land, Kathy 
Cramer’s work on rural politics in Wiscon-
sin, which both show how people devel-
op narratives of how to make sense of the 
world. For them, these narratives, or deep 
stories as Hochschild calls them, have real 
purpose, and it’s about getting into those 
moments, trying to develop long-term 
educational interventions that make a dif-
ference to how people see others who are 
unlike themselves.
It’s not simply about balancing opin-
ion as well. That’s been a trend in the media 
literacy literature going back thirty years – 
if only we could get people to weigh up the 
arguments on both sides, the argument 
runs. I’m not sure that that’s going to work. 
We have plenty of opportunities for people 
to learn online about different perspec-
tives on the world, but do these have utility 
for people in their everyday lives in their 
communities? For many people, it’s not a 
simple question of saying, “I’m going to 
go online and learn about all of the differ-
ent sides of the story” – not least because 
it becomes really exhausting to do that.
To come back to the role of news, jour-
nalists might need a much richer under-
standing of the kinds of information that 
people find useful in their communities 
and how they can intervene in those con-
texts to create information that empowers 
people with the truth. I don’t think jour-
nalists should just give up and say, “Every-
thing’s post truth. There’s indeterminacy 
everywhere. We can’t make a difference. 
Let’s just follow the dollars.” There are 
some newsrooms that may think like that, 
but journalism must retain its public mis-
sion to enlighten citizens. It’s a question of 
finding the truthful information that citi-
zens need in order to become empowered.
Russell: Conversely, what sorts of informa-
tion is disempowering, not only for the in-
dividual but for various groups?
Chadwick: Good question. Take, for exam-
ple, Urban Dictionary, which has been a 
fascination of mine for a long time now. I 
spoke about this at some length in a talk 
I gave at the Reuters Institute at Oxford in 
2018. My 11 year old daughter sometimes 
searches Google for stuff like language 
use, special terms, definitions, all sorts 
of slang, so I see this on a personal level. 
Now, I know that street slang evolves very 
quickly – absolutely. But Urban Dictionary 
is bizarre. It’s mixture of misogyny, rac-
ism, casual insults against all sorts of dif-
ferent religious communities, stuff that’s 
just made up, stuff that has no basis and 
terms that are clearly not used by people 
in everyday life. But this great piece just 
came out in New Media & Society by com-
munication and media scholars Debbie 
Ging, Theodore Lynn, and Pierangelo Ro-
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sati at Dublin City University. It just hit on 
the head what I was struggling with when 
trying to present last year at Reuters (to 
frowning faces) about why I think Urban 
Dictionary is a problem. (Incidentally, I 
dug into the economics of the site and how 
it’s funded through ads it sells through the 
Google Ad Exchange network and how it 
makes its money. It’s quite a lucrative web-
site, often in the top-500 Alexa rankings in 
the world. It’s seriously big, with 180 mil-
lion monthly page views, mostly clicked 
via Google search.)
Interestingly, given the mixed econ-
omy or the division of labor, however we 
might want to describe it, in content cre-
ation and linking in the online space, what 
Ging and her colleagues argue is that Ur-
ban Dictionary entries are hijacked by the 
manosphere online, who, after all, have 
their own mixed economy of content 
based around their own wikis and forums. 
Again, these are things that we used to 
celebrate about Web 2.0. We thought, It’s 
good. It’s empowering lots of people. Well, 
yes, it’s empowering extreme misogynists 
as well. So the lexicon of the manosphere 
gets encoded into the entries in Urban 
Dictionary, and then people do searches 
on Google, and the economy of attention 
has already been hijacked because Goo-
gle is prioritizing Urban Dictionary in its 
search results. The implication of Ging’s 
and her colleagues’ article is that we need 
to be much more strategic about examin-
ing these interconnections between online 
content – the divisions of labor between 
news and journalism, search engines and 
rankings, retweets, shares, likes, how all of 
that goes together in ways that can skew 
the information environment for people 
who are looking for particular types of in-
formation at particular moments.
Recently, Michael Golebiewski and 
danah boyd at Data & Society released a 
new report about data voids. I don’t know 
if you’ve seen this – ?
Russell: Yes, it’s about how data voids, or 
searches that turn up little to no results, are 
seen as opportunities by people looking to 
manipulate the information environment 
and so fill those voids with misinformation. 
Chadwick: Right. That really struck a 
chord. This is something we need to pay 
much more attention to – and I think 
journalists in particular should be aware 
of how this works. Journalists can make a 
difference because many have the power 
to introduce information into the public 
sphere, which will get highly ranked by 
Google, and prioritized in search. It may 
also get prioritized in social media feeds 
if what the social media companies say 
about prioritizing reputable sources and 
curating feeds with human intervention 
actually happens and makes a difference. 
Facebook’s record has been patchy in that 
regard, lately.
Take, for example, the issue of climate 
change or science communication more 
broadly: these areas are problematic as 
well because much of the scientific litera-
ture doesn’t get returned in regular Google 
searches. Even if it did, would it be acces-
sible to the average member of the public? 
Probably not. Again, that places a huge 
responsibility on journalists to introduce 
high-quality information into the public 
realm, in the knowledge (or perhaps hope) 
that, in turn, it will have an influence on 
search rankings and ultimately determine 
people’s ability to find good information. 
It’s probably time we moved away from 
this notion that the Internet is all about 
social media news feeds or all about news 
organizations’ websites, and toward the 
assumption that there’s actually a compli-
cated division of labor when it comes to 
the production and consumption of on-
line information.
Russell: Point well taken – and I’m not 
sure how Google has managed to sidestep 
so many of these debates. It’s a messy com-
plicated set of realities, and one that’s only 
going to grow more complicated. But if 
we start taking a more holistic view of the 
problems and of the solutions, along the 
lines that you’re talking about, we’ll be bet-
ter prepared. I keep thinking the main insti-
tutions of democratic society have just been 
so reactive, or less than reactive – which I 
think is what has people terrified about the 
era of widespread deepfakes, which seems 
like it’s days away at this point.
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Chadwick: Yes, Cristian Vaccari and I have 
a project underway here at O3C on deep-
fakes, on which Cristian is leading. The 
first disturbing thing about deepfake video 
comes from what we know about individ-
uals and how they process information. 
We know from experimental research that 
individuals are more likely to recall video 
and image content than they are textual 
content. That was demonstrated in exper-
imental settings long before digital media 
emerged.
On the other hand, we spend a long 
time in communication and media re-
search examining the active audience 
and in understanding how people make 
sense and interrogate the nature of media 
content. People adapt their expectations 
over time to what’s factual and what’s fic-
tional. It’s really fascinating. Take, for ex-
ample, early cinema. When cinema was 
introduced in the 1890s, people would 
go into movie theaters and be astonished 
and sometimes scared out of their wits. 
Some people were terrorized by images 
they’d never seen before. A good example 
is when, in 1895, the Lumière brothers 
screened their short film « L’Arrivée d’un 
Train en Gare de La Ciotat » (“Arrival of a 
Train at La Ciotat Station”). But people 
soon adapt. Special effects in Hollywood, 
the line between fact and fiction: humans 
are really good at making that distinction.
The problem with deepfake video is 
that it’s fabricated nonfiction. It’s not fic-
tional content and it’s not wholly about 
entertainment. Imagine a viral video 
deepfake of, say, a politician or perhaps 
more likely, a newsreader or a reporter that 
isn’t particularly well known, speaking in a 
mocked-up studio news environment. The 
problem is that it’s so perfectly executed 
and the representation is so convincing. If 
we think about this, it throws into jeopardy 
some of these preconceived ideas we have 
about the active audience and our ability 
to decode political bias.
Add into that mix the rapid-fire nature 
of exposure to these videos and the ways 
people seem to be very comfortable now 
in spreading information (in ways that re-
searchers didn’t foresee) very, very quickly, 
even if they haven’t interrogated it. Shar-
ing without adequately reflecting upon the 
content or checking it, the desire to fit in, 
the excitement, the thrill of participating 
in the news cycle. All of these things are 
important and need to be brought into the 
analytical mix as well. That’s the problem 
of deepfake video: it speaks to an envi-
ronment where the kinds of expectations 
that we used to have about how audienc-
es critically interrogate content become 
somewhat unsettled. How can audiences 
contextualize a deepfake video of a politi-
cian or a journalist when the deepfake has 
been created by deep learning AI scripts 
that actually draw upon the other public-
ly available representations of that person 
that are online?
It’s a dystopian version of intertextu-
ality, in which the deepfake video is itself 
fabricated from existing publicly available 
video, audio, and still images of a person 
that already exist in the public realm. The 
idea that we can get to the bottom of it is 
problematic … You see what I’m saying?
Russell: Yeah, it’s sort of, for now, not re-
ally fiction; it’s fabricated reality. It’s the 
real person in a real setting that that real 
person really exists in a lot of the time – a 
news-show set, a stump speech stage, on the 
floor of Congress, whatever. So it demands a 
new digital literacy to detect it as quickly – 
or more quickly – than the time it would 
take your impulse to share to spur you to 
act! The mechanisms are so sophisticated 
that you can’t anticipate that they would 
be factoring into what you’re witnessing. At 
least at first, in the first-wave deepfake era, 
you’re not properly, instinctively on guard.
Chadwick: Logically, it’s problematic be-
cause there’s no obviously discernible un-
derneath, below the surface, due to how 
the technology seems to be developing. 
I don’t really have any good answers to 
this one. That’s why I think regulation is 
actually really important in the sphere 
of deepfakes, and I think the platforms 
themselves have started to realize this as 
well. I mean, Zuckerberg came out with it 
last week, where he said, “Deepfakes are a 
problem.” Jack Dorsey, one of the found-
ers of Twitter, explicitly mentioned the 
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problem of deepfakes in his tweets when 
he was talking about Twitter’s decision to 
ban political advertising. It’s that sense of 
not being able to get beyond the surface to, 
I don’t know, factcheck. It is more difficult 
to factcheck a deepfake when the deepfake 
itself has been made from resources in the 
public domain.
This presents liberal democracies with 
a major challenge. The biggest long-term 
problem with a culture of indeterminacy is 
the lack of trust that emerges from it. If it 
becomes hugely exhausting trying to make 
sense of this environment, and if there’s a 
realization that the old tools of fact-check-
ing and responsible journalism will work 
only some of the time and a lot of the time 
will be compromised, then we could be 
in trouble. One of the problems is that it 
opens up space for authoritarian leaders 
to say, “I’m going to restore order,” and we 
could then end up with regulation of me-
dia that is draconian.
On the other hand, the other prob-
lem is that people withdraw into the pri-
vate sphere and they think, “Politics is not 
for me. That’s the public realm. It’s crazy.” 
Then I think we could be in trouble.
Russell: That’s a very optimistic statement 
you just made, I think. “We could be in 
trouble” you said. That means we could not 
be in trouble, too! I’m pretty sure we’re in 
trouble.
Chadwick: If we just let these forces have 
free rein, then liberal democracies could 
be in trouble in the longer term, because 
the cultural effects over time could be 
damaging. It’s not just a question of people 
actively participating in spreading illiberal 
ideas. It’s also that people will withdraw 
into their private sphere and say, “This isn’t 
for me.” Dissident critiques of propaganda 
in the Soviet Union and the former Eastern 
Bloc states discussed this. Much of the em-
phasis in propaganda studies has been on 
persuasion, influence, and deception, or 
how it leads people to adopt false beliefs. 
But one of the real problems of propagan-
da in the Eastern European context – if you 
read dissident-turned president Vaclav 
Havel on Czechoslovakia in the 1970s – 
one of the problems was withdrawal. Peo-
ple just think, Well, I’m going to stay out of 
public life and I’m not going to get involved. 
It just becomes too difficult and I think 
that’s a real problem that we might face if 
indeterminacy becomes widespread. Han-
nah Arendt, in her writing about the nature 
of totalitarianism also raised this problem. 
This is much more damaging, and just as 
damaging as the argument that harass-
ment and intimidation silences people. It’s 
related. The alt-right are very aware, when 
they organize concerted harassment at-
tacks on feminists or people of color, they 
know what they’re doing. It’s not just that 
they’re trying to spread the word about 
their ideas. They’re also trying to silence 
their targets, get them to withdraw into the 
private sphere.
Russell: Whitney Phillips (2019) recently 
wrote a fascinating piece published in So-
cial Media + Society that interrogates the 
influence of subcultural trolling and what 
she calls exclusionary laughter. In it she ar-
gues that mainstream culture has played a 
key role in normalizing cultures of hate by 
allowing their expressions to be amplified 
under the guise of humor without consid-
ering the impact that amplification has on 
groups who are their direct targets. Related-
ly, Mike Ananny (2017, 2018) has been writ-
ing about listening and the role networked 
press systems can and ought to play in en-
suring certain stories, groups, voices don’t 
become eclipsed by all of the noise. It’s real-
ly key for us to be paying attention to what 
kind of people are most likely to withdraw 
and based on what kind of factors. And 
what kind of changes would prevent that 
kind of exodus? You can imagine the net-
work splitting into neighborhoods, some 
clean and neat, more civil, more informed, 
but also more constrained and expensive, 
others more expressive but also cluttered 
with ads and hateful trolling. On some level 
you can see the momentum for that kind of 
thing already building.
Chadwick: I agree. Again, it comes back to 
this idea that the media environment now 
is very different from the one that pre-
vailed 20 years ago. Media today are not 
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just about communication; they’re about 
organization. If you think back to the early 
debates about digital media and politics in 
the 2000s when Bruce Bimber, Lance Ben-
nett, Dave Karpf, myself and others were 
theorizing how digital media may spur or-
ganizational change – one of the strands of 
the hybrid media system framework. You 
can also apply these ideas now to the issue 
of silencing and marginalization online. 
When white supremacists and misogynists 
mobilize harassment in a distributed net-
work environment, they are using media 
as a means to force organizational change 
upon their opponents. The organizational 
outcome in this case is silencing and de-
mobilization of those opponents. When 
women see other women being harassed 
online they are more likely to think “I’m a 
woman. I’m a feminist but I don’t want to 
be out there in the public realm because I 
don’t want to be attacked. I don’t want to 
be doxed. I don’t want my personal data 
put all over the Internet. I don’t want peo-
ple creating pornographic deepfake videos 
of me.”
This, again, is a democratically dys-
functional outcome of the communica-
tion-as-organization idea that was so im-
portant when social media were new, a 
decade ago. And now, more than ever, we 
can learn from the insights of that work 
but recalibrate them for a new era. We 
again need to go beyond the idea that dig-
ital media are solely about the transmis-
sion of messages or representations, and 
instead focus on how they have become 
central to all types of formal and informal 
organizational power.
References
Ananny, M. (2017). The whitespace press: 
Designing meaningful absences into 
networked news. In P. J. Boczkowski & 
C. W. Anderson (Eds.), Remaking the news: 
Essays on the future of journalism scholar-
ship in the digital age (pp. 129–146).  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ananny, M. (2018). Networked press freedom: 
Creating infrastructures for a public right 
to hear. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Arendt, H. (1973). The origins of totalitarian-
ism. New York: Harcourt, Brace,  
Jovanovich.
Bennett, L. & Segerberg, A. (2013). The logic of 
connective action: Digital media and the 
personalization of contentious politics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bucher, T. (2018). If … then: Algorithmic power 
and politics. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Chadwick, A. (2017). The hybrid media system: 
Politics and power, 2nd edition, New York: 
Oxford University Press.
Cramer, K. (2016). The politics of resentment: 
Rural consciousness in Wisconsin and the 
rise of Scott Walker. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.
Deuze, M. (2012). Media life. Cambridge: Polity.
Ging, D., Lynn, T., & Rosati, P. (2019). Neo lo-
gising misogyny: Urban Dic tiona ry’s folk-
sonomies of sexual abuse. New Media & 
Society. doi:10.1177/1461444819870306
Golebiewski, M. & boyd, d. (2019). Data  
voids: Where missing data can easily be 
exploited. Data & Society. https:// 
datasociety.net/output/data-voids/
Hochschild, A. R. (2018). Strangers in their own 
land: Anger and mourning on the Ameri-
can right. New York: New Press. 
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social:  
An introduction to actor-network-theory. 
London: Oxford University Press.
Livingstone, S. (2004). Media literacy and the 
challenge of new information and com-
munication technologies. The Communi-
cation Review 7(1), 3–14.
Petersen, M.B., Osmundsen, M. & Arceneaux, 
K. (2018). A need for chaos and the sharing 
of hostile political rumors in advanced 
democracies, American Political Science 
Association conference paper. https:// 
psyarxiv.com/6m4ts/
Phillips, W. (2019). It wasn’t just the trolls: Early 
Internet culture, “fun,” and the fires of ex-
clusionary laughter. Social Media + Society. 
doi:10.1177/2056305119849493 
Russell, A (2016). Journalism as activism: Re-
coding media power. Cambridge: Polity.
